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ABSTRACT 
 
This study uses California crime statistics for the years 1984-2004, to determine what effect, if 
any, the increased sentencing standards under the three-strikes legislation in California have had 
in deterring crime. This study follows a new approach in differentiating between the 
incapacitation effect and the deterrent effect of the law. Incapacitation is tested by tracking the 
change in prison population. Our results show that the three strikes legislation had a significant 
deterrent effect on total and property crime, but not so for violent crime. We find no support for 
incapacitation in the limited time period following the three-strikes legislation.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
n response to what had been a rapid increase in crime in the preceding decade, the citizens of California 
voted in favor of a bill proposing a three strikes law in November 1994. This law provided for lengthened 
prison sentences for repeat offenders. The letter of the law states that offenders who commit one violent 
or serious felony offense are subject to harsher sentences for any subsequent crime. In the case of a second violent or 
serious offense, the offender would receive a sentence length double what the typically suggested sentence would 
be. Additionally, property crimes, specifically theft, become felony offenses in the event that an individual has a 
prior conviction of the same nature. For example, suppose an individual is convicted of two counts of auto theft once 
and is then arrested for grand theft a decade after his release from prison. The charge, which can be considered a 
misdemeanor and which carries a one year sentence, is elevated to felony status and the offender would be sentenced 
to 2 years imprisonment. Additionally, the offender must serve a minimum of 80% of the sentence before having the 
chance of parole.  
 
Any offender who is arrested and charged with a violent or serious felony offense that has two or more of 
the same convictions can be and typically is sentenced to a minimum of 25 years and a maximum of life in prison in 
California’s judicial system, given the specific nature of their offenses. The basic sentencing structure is: first 
offense: standard, second offense: double suggested sentence, third offense: 25 to life. The rationale behind the law 
was that extended sentences would remove repeat offenders from society for long periods of time, thereby restricting 
their ability to commit additional crimes. Further, the threat of long sentences would also deter would-be offenders 
from committing new crimes.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented by John Kelly, at the Undergraduate Business and Economics Conference, at 
Ursinus College on April 2008. We wish to extend our thanks to an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions on an earlier 
version. 
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Figure 1. Crime in California per 100,000 population: 1984-2004 
 
 
Figure 1, shows significant declines in property and total crime from 1992 onwards. Although violent crime 
also declined during the period, the decline is not as steep. Many supporters point to the three strikes law as the most 
prominent reason for the notable and consistent drop in crime in the period following the law’s passage. Detractors 
on the other hand point to the fact that crime was already going down before its passage. Critics also point out that 
most crimes are committed when criminals are young, locking felons away for long periods, does not serve any 
useful purpose.  Since its implementation, convicts and their families have appealed, citing cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
 
While there have been many studies
2
 on the effect of the three-strikes legislation, serious statistical analysis 
of the issue include studies by Zimmring et al. 2001 and Marvell and Moody, 2001,  followed by Shepherd (2002), 
Helland and Taborrak (2002) and Worrall (2004). The evidence from these studies are somewhat mixed. While 
Shepherd finds that the three-strikes legislation has a significant deterrent effect, studies by Zimmring (2001) and 
Worrall (2004) do not find evidence of deterrence, rather that crime is reduced due to incapacitation. Still others like 
Marvell and Moody (2001) find that the laws caused violent crime to increase.  
 
The present study explores the deterrent and incapacitative effects of the three-strikes legislation in 
California by providing a more definitive test for incapacitation than the ones devised by Marvell and Moody (2001) 
and used by Worrall (2004).   
 
2.  PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
Becker’s (1968) seminal research on an economic model of crime effectively changed the way that analysts 
look at deterrence. Becker wrote that criminals act based upon three criteria: the benefit of a given crime - both 
financial and psychological, the legitimate opportunities an individual has to generate those same benefits and the 
likelihood of being apprehended and sentenced. If the potential costs of committing crime are greater than the 
benefits, an individual is deterred from making a criminal decision. Many of these ideas are borrowed directly by 
Kessler and Levitt (1999) and Shepherd (2002), as seen below. 
 
                                                 
2 See e.g. studies by Macallair and Males (1999) California’s Center of Juvenile and Criminal Justice and Brown and Jolivette 
(2005) 
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Kessler and Levitt (1999) use a theoretical model to show how sentence enhancements (under Proposition 
8) can be used to distinguish between the incapacitation and deterrent effect of the legislation. Proposition 8, the first 
sentence enhancement legislation similar to the three-strikes law was passed in 1982 in California. The authors 
argue that, since enhancements are tacked on to prison sentences that would have been served anyway, there is no 
immediate incapacitation effect. Thus any decline in crime immediately following such legislation can be attributed 
to deterrence. Further, they also argue that if incapacitation is the driving force, then the three strikes law (under 
Proposition 8) should lead to sizeable increases in the number of felons behind bars and eventually to a prison 
population that is aged out of crime. On the other hand if three strikes leads to deterrence, it should result in a 
decline in crime along with a decline in incarceration. Their results provide mixed support for the three strikes law. 
Using data on eligible and ineligible crimes they find that Proposition 8 reduced eligible crimes by 4 percent within 
a year and 8 percent 3 years hence. They also found large lagged declines in crime, consistent with incapacitation. 
 
Shepherd (2002) published a study attempting to address the problems facing three prominent studies 
(Kessler and Morrison, 1998, Marvell and Moody, 2001 and Zimmring et al. 2001) regarding the deterrent effect of 
California’s three-strikes law. The Zimmring (2001) study drew its conclusions from raw data before and after the 
passage of the law, while Kessler and Morrison (1998) and Marvell and Moody (2001) used a dummy variable to 
represent the existence of a strike law in states. These studies either found no deterrent effect for the three-strikes 
law or that it actually increased crime. Shepherd (2002) argues that a dummy variable measure of three-strikes, does 
not account for how frequently or aggressively states apply the three-strikes law and therefore does not fully capture 
the deterrent effect. Further, that aggregate data at the state level overlooks county-specific variations.  
 
Instead, Shepherd uses the probability of a three-strikes sentence, calculated by dividing the number of 
three-strikes sentences by the number of individuals receiving any sentence, to measure deterrence. Using data at the 
county-level, the study found that the three-strikes legislation had resulted in significant reductions in crime 
throughout the state of California.  
 
Helland and Tabarrok (2002), analyzed the findings and methods of Kessler and Levitt (1999) and 
Shepherd (2002) and developed a non-parametric approach to analyze the effect of pre-and post legislation on 
aggregate crime. This study followed the survival rates of a set of recent prison releases to calculate the likelihood of 
relapse and subsequent re-incarceration. Focusing on criminal behavior allowed Helland and Tabarrok to directly 
evaluate criminal decision making and its relation to legislative deterrence; his study found a pronounced deterrent 
effect (Helland and Tabarrok, 2002). 
 
Thompson (2002) reminds us, in a socio-legal perspective, that criminals are highly unlikely to weigh the 
cost/benefit ratio discussed by Becker when committing a crime at a certain time. Additionally, many crimes are not 
impacted by sentence enhancements. Serious crimes such as rape and murder, are most frequently one-time offenses 
and as such are deterred with less frequency than other serious offenses included in the legislation. Thompson also 
points to the fact that the law’s enforcement within California counties varies and, in most cases, areas in which the 
law is enforced less strictly had larger drops in crime than their less liberal counterparts (Thompson 2002).  
 
Worrall (2004) attempted to incorporate the best practices of previous studies while correcting for errors in 
other researchers’ modeling. The study models the incapacitative effect of three-strikes along with its deterrent 
effect. Following Shepherd (2002) this study uses the probability of receiving three-strikes to study the deterrent 
effect. To model incapacitation the study follows Marvell and Moody (2001), who used a linear trend variable 
starting in the year of passage of the law through the last year in their dataset; with a negative and significant 
coefficient indicating incapacitation. After controlling for county-specific factors and economic and demographic 
factors the study concludes that the deterrent and incapacitative effects of the three-strikes legislation is weak, at 
best.  The results can be drawn into question, as it is rather unclear how the trend variable actually measures the 
incapacitation effect. The negative coefficient of the trend variable is more likely to pick up the negative trends in 
crime following three-strikes.  
 
While the attempt to differentiate between deterrence and incapacitation in Worrall’s (2004) study is a 
significant one, we believe that the measure of incapacitation is inadequate. In the present study we try to provide a 
more definitive measure of incapacitation by tracking the change in prison population. As Kessler and Levitt(1999) 
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point out, “(i)f incapacitation is the primary force, then three-strikes laws will lead to enormous increases in the 
numbers of prisoners … that is largely  aged out of crime.” In contrast “if deterrence is the operative force, then 
three-strikes laws will lead to an equilibrium with both lower crime and lower levels of incarceration…” Following, 
this argument we use the change in prison population as our variable to test for incapacitation. The initial goal of 
this legislation was to reduce crime by raising its costs. Thus if incapacitation is the force behind the decline in 
crime in California, the variable should have a negative and significant coefficient i.e. as more criminals are put 
behind bars less crime is committed. However, if the coefficient is positive, as Kessler and Levitt posit, deterrence 
must be at work. Seeing a prison population decline in spite of persistence in strike convictions is an indicator that 
the public at large is being deterred from a life of crime. 
 
Further, to test if sentence enhancements under the three-strikes legislation is what causes this deterrent 
effect, we use the probability of receiving three-strikes
3
 measured by dividing three-strikes sentences by the number 
incarcerated for all crimes.  
 
3.  MODEL AND VARIABLES 
 
 This study uses time-series data on total, violent and property crime for the period 1984 through 2004, to 
measure the deterrent and incapacitative effects of the three-strikes legislation in the state of California. In addition 
to controlling for socio-economic factors, the study also controls for law-enforcement variables and handgun sales. 
The study models the incapacitation effect using data on the change in prison population, instead of a trend variable 
used in previous studies, while and the deterrence effect is measured by the probability of third-strike convictions. 
 
Crimet(i) = 0 + 1 policet + 2 prosecutorst + 3 handgunst +  4 incomet  
  + 5 ethnicity + 6  3Strikest + 7 (Δ prison pop)t + εt  (Eqn 1)   
  
Police- the number of police employed by the state and prosecutors – the number of prosecutors in the state – 
measure the effects of law enforcement. An increase in the number of police can mean that more arrests are made 
and more crimes are stopped during their commission. The number of prosecutors dictates how many cases go to 
trial; if more cases are pursued to their full extent and longer sentences are given, people, in theory, may be less 
likely to commit crimes, especially when taking three-strikes into account.  
 
Handguns – the number of handguns sold goes a long way to explain how many crimes, especially violent, are 
committed. The available data, however, comes from new arms dealer sales figures. There are far more guns on the 
streets which are unaccounted for and compiling even reasonably accurate figures to demonstrate this is difficult. 
Additionally, new gun sales number could reflect citizens acquiring guns to defend against violent criminals (though 
this is unlikely, considering crime rates are declining), which would undoubtedly skew the results. Still, the use of a 
firearm in the commission of any crime can make it a felony case, and so this number cannot be ignored when 
developing a model. To account for the effects of socio-economic factors our model controls for income - measured 
by median household income and race/ethnicity - percentage of black and hispanic population.  
 
Finally, we use the probability of 3Strike to measure the deterrent effect of extended sentences under the 
three-strikes legislation. Probability of 3Strike is measured by dividing the number of three-strikes sentences by the 
number incarcerated rather than number of arrests used by Worrall (2004). Using the number incarcerated in the 
denominator is more appropriate, as every arrest does not necessarily result in conviction. Shepherd (2002) has 
argued that including information on the frequency of three strikes, accounts for how "aggressively" the three-strikes 
legislation is prosecuted, which is superior to using a simple 0-1 dummy variable (e.g. Marvell and Moody, 2001).  
Further, we believe that the effect of sentence enhancement is best studied using three-strikes sentences. Three-
strikes sentences, rather than two-strikes, should have a stronger deterrent effect on would-be criminals as the length 
of sentencing is significantly enhanced for a third-strike (25 years to life).  
 
                                                 
3 We believe that using three-strikes conviction instead of two- and three-strikes is a better and clearer measure of the deterrent 
effects of extended sentences, as the average length of a three-strike conviction is 37.5 years while that of a two-strike is only 
around 3.9 years (Shepherd, 2002). 
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Change in prison population – is the variable used to test if incapacitation is the driving force behind the decline in 
California crime. While a negative and significant coefficient supports incapacitation, a significant positive 
coefficient supports deterrence (see discussion in the previous section). Kessler and Levitt (1999) wrote that the 
distinction between the two forces of deterrence and incapacitation is not merely an academic exercise; rather it is 
crucial to determining the costs and benefits associated with sentence enhancements, particularly for three-strikes 
laws. 
 
Most of our data on crime rates, law enforcement, handguns, and demographics were obtained from the 
Criminal Justice Statistics Center, State of California, Department of Justice
4
. Median household income is obtained 
from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.Three-strikes sentences and change in prison 
population figures were taken from the California Attorney General’s Office 10 Year report on three-strikes laws.5 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
 The model outlined above is estimated separately for violent, property and total crime with data for the 
period 1984 through 2004. The results are reported in table 1.  
 
 
Table 1: Regression Results 
 Total Crime Violent Property 
    
Intercept 3262.374 128.064 3134.086 
 (3.50)*** (0.37) (5.17)*** 
Police 0.010 0.004 0.006 
 (0.57) (0.66) (0.51) 
Prosecutors 0.017 0.014 0.002 
 (0.44) (1.02) (0.10) 
Guns 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (1.36) (2.16)** (0.86) 
Median Household Income -0.042 -0.006 -0.036 
 (-1.42) (-0.55) (-1.87)* 
    
Black & Hispanic Pop 119.934 22.562 98.376 
 (2.63)** (1.33) (3.32)*** 
    
Δ in Prison Pop 0.074 0.025 0.049 
 (3.06)*** (2.74)** (3.14)*** 
    
Three-Strikes -115.729 -21.473 -94.261 
 (-2.51)** (-1.25) (-3.15)*** 
    
 
Adjusted R2 0.969 0.965 0.979 
* Indicates statistical significance at 0.10 level;**Indicates statistical significance at .05 level;*** Indicates statistical 
significance at 0.01 level 
 
 
The numbers of police, prosecutors and handguns on the streets all had very small, seemingly negligible 
coefficients. An analysis of the t-stat values reveals that, for the most part, that they are statistically insignificant. In 
no model does the number of police play a significant role in reducing crime rates. The number of prosecutors also 
plays no role in deterrence. This is surprising; as the number of police and prosecutors employed by the state 
increase, the likelihood of being apprehended, prosecuted and convicted for committing a crime increases as well. 
                                                 
4
  Criminal Justice Statistics Center,http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/datatabs.htm. 
5  According to the report this data is obtained from the California Department of Corrections:  
www.corr.ca.gov/OffenderInfoServices/Reports/Annual/HIST2/HIST2d2002.pdf;                           
www.corr.ca.gov/offenderinfoservices/reports/quarterly/Strike1/STRIKE1d0403.pdf.  
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Instead of seeing the expected negative relationships, we see negligible, positive relationships, suggesting possibly 
that as crime falls, the number of law enforcement employees drops subtly as a result. The number of handguns sold 
on the year shows a positive and statistically significant relationship for violent crimes but not for property crimes or 
total crimes. This suggests that crime control variables together cannot explain the decline in crime rate in 
California.  
 
It may be argued that an improvement in economic well-being should have a negative impact on crime. 
While the coefficient for median household income has the correct sign in all three cases it turns out to be 
insignificant in explaining total and violent crime.  Median household income is close to significance when 
evaluating property crimes alone, suggesting that socioeconomic factors do, in fact, play a role in deterring crimes 
committed for financial benefit. Violent crimes are more difficult to predict, especially since a large proportion of it 
is the result of gang violence.  
 
Because the population size of both African-American and Latino street gangs in California is unavailable, 
to compensate, the total minority populations were evaluated instead. Being as Asians are historically the victims of 
violence, they were left out of the equation. California’s most active violent gangs all have primarily African-
American or Latino membership; furthermore, those most impacted by economic difficulties and social proximity to 
criminal circumstances are the same two populations of individuals. The high coefficients and strong t-statistics 
suggest that African-American and Latino populations do have strong impacts on crime rates. 
 
Turning to our measure of incapacitation – the coefficient for change in prison population is surprisingly 
positive and statistically significant in all cases. As indicated in an earlier discussion - for incapacitation to be the 
driving force behind falling crime rate in California this coefficient should be significantly negative. This 
relationship is so strongly positive, in fact, that we can confidently state that the results indicate that there is virtually 
no measurable incapacitation effect on crime rates, at least when analyzing current data. Instead the positive and 
significant relationship suggests that both factors being analyzed move in the same direction. As crime goes down, 
so does the additions to prison population – which Kessler and Levitt (1999) indicate is consistent with deterrence! 6  
 
Can the deterrent effect be attributed to the three-strikes legislation? The significance of the three-strikes 
law in deterring crime is notable in these regression analyses. The coefficient of the three strikes variable is large 
and negative for total and violent crime rate regressions. Our results suggest that the existence of the three-strikes 
law deters the commission of roughly 116 total crimes per 100,000 citizens of California each year and about 94 
property crimes. The aforementioned Kessler and Levitt (1999) article supports our findings. Furthermore, because 
of how we separated out the incapacitation effect, we can state that it is the three-strikes legislation that is largely 
responsible for this drop in crime rates.  
 
The negative coefficient on the strike sentence variable is insignificant and much smaller in magnitude for 
violent crime (which includes: homicides, rape, robbery and assault). These findings support the results from 
Shepherd (2002) and Thompson (2002) and confirm the prediction that stricter sentencing may not lead to 
significant decreases in the number of murders and rape committed. Finally, the adjusted R
2
 in all three regressions 
is around 97% which indicates a good fit. 
 
We should however point out that the lack of evidence for incapacitation effect in our study is based on a 
limited time-series following the passage of the three-strikes legislation. Many offenders who have received 
enhanced sentences are still serving standard jail terms after the law’s passage; it is not until they begin serving their 
enhanced terms that a tangible incapacitation effect on crime could be measured. Finally, the number of illegal 
immigrants in California, the membership size and activity of gangs in many areas and figures related to education 
were not readily available for analysis..  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 In this regard Worrall’s (2004) interpretation of the negative coefficient of the time-trend variable as a measure of 
incapacitation may be questioned. It is more likely that the negative time-trend picks up the negative trend in crime in California.  
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5.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The results of the regression analysis show that California’s three-strikes law is statistically significant as a 
factor that drives down the rate of crime; it plays a much greater role in deterrence when economic factors are 
controlled for even when those factors prove to be not significant themselves. Surprisingly, the number of police, 
number of prosecutors employed by district attorneys and the number of handguns sold in a year are not significant 
in driving crime down. 
 
 In this study we devised a measure of incapacitation that tracks the change in prison population against 
crime. The concurrent declines in prison population and all three measures of crime, refutes the argument that 
incapacitation might have led to the recent declines in crime rate in California. Instead, the positive relationship 
between the two variables supports deterrence. It appears that the three-strikes legislation deterred would-be 
criminals from committing new crimes thereby reducing the crime rate and the additions made to the prison 
population.  
 
The fact that the model for violent crime behaves differently than total and property crime, especially that 
the three-strikes legislation has no statistical significance in its deterrence suggests that on the whole, violent crime 
is generally harder to prevent than other types of crime. The length of sentencing for murder and rape are 
significantly high to start with, which might also make the three-strikes law less effective in deterring such crime. 
 
While there are suggestions as to how to tweak the law to keep certain offenders from serving 
disproportionately long sentences for seemingly minor crimes, for the most part, one can argue that sentencing 
enhancements can act as an effective deterrent to crime. While the three-strikes law is not the only answer, it is part 
of a whole that has provided a solution to what was fast becoming a serious problem in the state of California. The 
legislation has been deemed so successful, in fact, that almost all states in the union have adopted their own version 
of a three-strikes law; the federal government has done so as well.  
 
Finally, a future avenue for research on this issue would be to see the impact of the three-strikes law on the 
behavior of repeat offenders. The nature of the three strikes law is such that, repeat offenders bear the immediate 
brunt of the legislation. It would be interesting to see if the harsh sentencing standards for second and third strike 
eligible offenders alters the likelihood and the nature of crimes committed! 
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